Leibnizs Distinction Between Natural and Artificial Machines :: Philosophy Philosophical Essays

Leibniz's Distinction Between Natural and Artificial Machines ABSTRACT: I maintain that Leibniz's distinction between 'organic machines of nature' and the artificial machine that we produce cannot be adequately understood simply in terms of differing orders of structural complexity. It is not simply that natural machines, having been made by God, are infinitely more complex than the products of our own artifice. Instead, Leibniz's distinction is a thoroughly metaphysical one, having its root in his belief that every natural machine is a corporeal substance, the unity and identity conditions of which derive ultimately from its substantial form. Natural machines are thus true unities, while artificial machines are mere aggregates of substances and are therefore only accidental unities. I briefly explore this connection between Leibniz's distinction between natural and artificial machines and his views about individuality. I conclude on a polemical note, in which it is suggested that these results undermine the currently popular view that Leibniz renounced corporeal substances toward the end of his life. Introduction Leibniz often distinguishes between organic machines of nature and the machines that we construct. This distinction might not seem to have been an original contribution on his part. Similar distinctions were drawn by many early modern philosophers, particularly Cartesians, who contrasted our machines with the much more complex (yet mechanical) products of the divine artifice. Leibniz's distinction was not this simple. For him, the difference between our machines and organic machines of nature was not simply a difference in degree: it was not simply a matter of God's machines being more structurally complex than the mechanisms that we produce. More generally, Leibniz's distinction between organic (i.e., natural) and human-made (i.e., artificial) machines cannot be understood as long as we confine our gaze to the realm of mechanical phenomena that are described by physics, for it is a deeper metaphysical distinction rooted in his views about substances. Leibniz does occasionally draw the distinction in terms of structural complexity, claiming that natural machines, since they were built by God, are infinitely more complex than the machines that we make. This might appear to undermine my claim that Leibniz's distinction cannot (unlike similar distinctions drawn by his contemporaries) be understood simply in terms of varying degrees of structural complexity. However, I shall contend that his formulation of the distinction in terms of structural complexity presupposes a more basic difference between natural and artificial machines, a difference that can only be adequately characterized within his metaphysics.